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INTRODUCTION
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the accused's right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, a right so important to the Founding Fathers that they made
it an integral right under the Sixth Amendment.1 The right to cross-examine is

* Professor Robert Hardaway, Sturm College of Law at the University of Denver. With gratitude to my
research assistants Austin J. Chambers, J.D. Candidate of the Sturm College of Law, 2017 and Kathryn
A. DeVries, J.D. Candidate of the Sturm College of Law, 2015.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in relevant part, "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). However, the "rights conferred by
the Confrontation Clause are not absolute and may give way to other important interests." Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988) (allowing for two minors allegedly sexually assaulted by the defendant to
testify by video so as not to be subject to him "face to face"). See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40,43-44 (1980); Sarah M. Buel, Putting Forfeitureto Work, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1316 (2010)
(citing Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic
Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 317 (2005)). See also Lindsay Hoopes, Note,
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implicitly recognized in Rule 602,2 and in the hearsay rules set forth in article 8.3
In the years leading up to the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Crawford v.
Washington,4 a prosecutor could pursue a domestic violence case and introduce the
prior accusatory testimonial statement of the victim even if the victim refused to
appear at trial, declined to testify at trial, retracted a prior statement made to police,
or claimed lack of memory about the events described in her prior statement.
Introduction of a prior statement was permissible if the victim was unavailable, and
the statement bore "adequate indicia of reliability" as indicated by falling within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" or satisfied "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 5 In Crawford, the Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts,
holding that admission of a prior victim statement complied with the Confrontation
Clause only if the victim was unavailable, and the defendant had a "prior
opportunity to cross-examine." 7 Critics of Crawford claimed that it initiated an
"open season" on domestic violence victims by giving the defendant spouse an
irresistible motive to escape justice by intimidating, threatening, or even killing the
victim prior to the victim being becoming subject to cross-examination at trial.8

&

The Right to a Fair Trial and the Confrontation Clause: Overruling Crawford to Rebalance the U.S.
Criminal Justice Equilibrium, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305, 306 (2009) (stating "the
modern concept of the right to a fair trial, common throughout much of the international community,
was adopted and modeled after the U.S. Constitution's Sixth Amendment") (citing Frank R. Hermann
S.J. Brownlow M. Speer, Facingthe Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursorsof the Confrontation
Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 485-86 (1994) (noting that the Roman view that "it is better that the
crime of a guilty person remain unpunished than that an innocent person be convicted" and that
compatible law required "a defendant had the opportunity for a personal encounter with the accuser");
Jarot Hunt Scarbrough, Comment, The Swinging Pendulum of Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence:
Was Michigan v. Bryant a Response to the Inequitable Outcomes in Crawford, Davis, and Giles?, 36
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 153, 157 (2012) (stating that confrontation dates back to Roman times and was
adopted by the English, followed by the Founding Fathers and the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts)
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)); Recent Cases, Sixth Amendment-Witness
Confrontation-Forfeitureby Wrongdoing Doctrine, 122 HARV. L. REV. 336, 344-45 (2008) (stating, at
the time, interested persons, spouses, children, atheists, and convicted felons were barred from testifying
against the accused) (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present
Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1063, 1113 (1999) and citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/
07-6053.pdf (stating that at founding, a case such as Giles could not have been heard)).
2 FED. R. EvID. 602 ("A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.").
3 FED. R. EVID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement."). See Buel, supra note 1, at 1313 n.90 (citing, as examples of FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(6), United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-33 (5th Cir. 1982) (victim's testimony was
permitted pre-Crawfordwhen one of the counts charged against defendant was murder of the victim),
and United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (pre-Crawford, defendant lost the right
to cross-examine the undercover agent whom he killed during his arrest)). See also Carver v. United
States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897); Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 554 (1896) (noting that not all
dying declarations are necessarily reliable).
4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
5 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980).
6 448 U.S. 56.
7 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
8 Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterersAfter Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005).

2015]

PROMPT POST-ARREST CONFRONTATION HEARING

3

Although prosecutors have attempted to protect witnesses by relying on Rule
804(6), which purports to provide for admission of victim's statements at trial
where the prosecutor can prove that the defendant caused the victim's
unavailability, these efforts have proved mostly illusory. This is because the rule
requires the prosecutor to prove separately that the defendant caused the
unavailability of the witness, a task that is often as challenging as proving the
elements of the underlying case.
It has been noted that the cause of justice pays a high price for insuring the
right to physically confront a witness at trial-which may take place months or
even years after the arrest of the defendant-because it provides the accused with
ample time to intimidate or threaten potential witnesses against him. 9 Defendants
in domestic violence cases quickly realize that without a testifying witness at trial,
the case against him must be dismissed no matter how hideous the crime of which
he is charged.' 0 Witness tampering appears to work in favor of perpetrators,
particularly in domestic violence cases, because 80-90% of victims do not
cooperate with prosecutors in domestic violence cases. 11 These cases include
instances in which a witness mysteriously disappears prior to trial, declines to
testify, or refuses to cooperate with the prosecution.12 This has proved to be of
particular concern in domestic violence cases in which a battered spouse declined
to testify for a variety of reasons, including purported lack of memory, 13 a fear of
retribution either admitted or suspected, 14 a plea for understanding from the

9 Buel, supra note 1, at 1363 (citing Boyd v. Indiana, 866 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
("[The defendant] may not take advantage of [the victim]'s inability to testify, which was the natural
consequence of his own misconduct-murdering her.")).
10 Id. at 1304-05 (stating that "victims are too frightened to testify about both the initial crime and
subsequent witness tampering"). This argument works under the assumption that prior statements will
be inadmissible if a victim is too frightened to testify about witness tampering, which would allow
admission of the prior statements under the forfeiture doctrine. Buel further relies upon People v.
Santiago to argue that victims understand the seriousness of threats due to prior harm. People v.
Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 829, at *31-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003).
11 Id. at 1305 (citing Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and
Justicefor Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 359, 367 (1996) (citing Telephone
Interview with Candace Heisler, Supervising Assistant District Attorney of the San Francisco District
Attorney's Office (Sept. 29, 1995)).
12 People v. Henderson, 705 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding that the
defendant's attempt to cause the victim to fear him was sufficient evidence of victim tampering,
intimidation, and criminal solicitation). See State v. Charger, 611 N.W.2d 221, 228 (S.D. 2000)
(attempting to convince a witness to withhold information is sufficient to qualify as tampering); Navarro
v. State, 810 S.W.2d 432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (tampering occurred by attempted bribery in
exchange for altering testimony).
13 De Sanctis, supra note 11, at 367 (citing Telephone Interview with Candace Heisler, Supervising
Assistant District Attorney, San Francisco District Attorney's Office (Sept. 29, 1995)). Victims may
start out an investigation as uncooperative with prosecutors, or may later recant or prove reluctant fully
to cooperate. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970) (stating that witness "claimed a
loss of memory"). Although this case does not involve a situation of domestic violence, it sets a
standard that statements frorn a preliminary hearing may be used in place of forgotten information or an
uncooperative witness.
14 Sarah M. Buel, Fify Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 COLO. L. REv.
19, 20 (1999).
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prosecutor of a victim's desire to preserve the family unit, 15 or a claim that the
defendant has changed his ways and propensity for violence and is unlikely to
repeat his crime. 16
It is the aim of this article to propose a more effective means of eliminating a
defendant's motive to intimidate or harm domestic violence victims who may be
witnesses against the defendant at trial by providing defendants in domestic
violence cases with the right to cross-examine a complaining witness at a
confrontation hearing convened promptly after the defendant's arrest. Such a
procedure would both comply with the Crawford requirement of a "prior
opportunity to cross-examine" while reducing the time in which a defendant can
devise means of making the victim unavailable for trial.
While the thrust of this article is to focus primarily on the confrontation
requirement as it affects domestic violence victims, the requirement affects a far
broader class of victims as well. 17 For example, on June 23, 1985, Air India Flight
182 carrying 329 people to London blew up mid-flight, tossing screaming
passengers, including many women and children, into the air at 31,000 feet where
they endured a horrifying death either during the fall or when hitting the ocean
below. 18 The man accused of planting the bomb was charged with murder in a
Canadian Court. 19 Unfortunately, the prosecution's star witness, Tara Singh
Hayer, who had made prior statements implicating the defendant and was prepared
to testify at the trial, was assassinated by gunshot before the trial. 2 0 As a result,
Tara Singh Hayer's prior statement was held inadmissible and the defendant

15 De Sanctis, supra note 11, at 368 (citing Bettina Boxall & Frederick Muir, Prosecutors Taking
HarderLine Toward Spouse Abuse, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1994, at Al). Some prosecutors will follow
the wishes of victim-witnesses and avoid pursuing cases in which the victim will not cooperate due to
interest in preserving the family unit.
16 Buel, supra note 1, at 1324 (arguing that "but for" a defendant's tampering, the case would not
be procedurally blocked and noting that the federal crime victims' bill of rights affords victims "the
right to be reasonably protected from the accused offender") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(2) (repealed
2004)). See also Nancee Alexa Barth, Comment, "I'd Grab at Anything. And I'd Forget." Domestic
Violence Victim Testimony After Davis v. Washington, 41 1. MARSHALL L. REv. 937, 944 (2008)
(stating that one fifth of domestic violence victims do not want the abuser arrested and that such victims
may be more fearful of the consequences of holding the abuser accountable than remaining in the
relationship).
17 See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d
1271 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
18 B.N. KIRPAL, REPORT OF THE COURT INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT TO AIR INDIA BOEING 747
AIRCRAFT VT-EFO, "KANISHKA" ON 23 JUNE 1985, HIGH COURT OF DELHI 1-2, 64, 158-

71 (1986), https://archive.org/details/ReportOffheCourtlnvestigatingAccidentToAirndia7470n23rdJun
e1985.
19 Malik, Bagri Not Guilty in Air IndiaBombings, CBC (Mar. 16, 2005),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadalbritish-columbia/malik-bagri-not-guilty-in-air-india-bombings1.546764.
20 Kim Bolan, Tara Singh Ilayer Murder Probe Still Active, 11 Years Later, VANCOUVER SUN
(Nov. 18, 2009), http://web.archive.org/web/20100312001949/http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Tar
a+Singh+Hayer+murder+probe+still+active+years+later/2238518/story.html.

2015]

PROMPT POST-ARREST CONFRONTATION HEARING

5

charged with the murder of 329 men, women, and children escaped with only
minor charges. 2 1
Part I and Part II of this article discuss the consequences of Crawford v.
Washington22 for domestic violence victims and detail the problem of domestic
violence in America, including the current prosecution strategies and challenges in
domestic violence cases. Part III reviews the evolution of confrontation law
jurisprudence. Part IV sets forth a proposed Crawford-compliant procedure that
also protects domestic violence victims. Part V addresses anticipated objections to
the prompt-post arrest confrontation hearing.
1. CRA WFORD'S CONSEQUENCES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
23
Domestic violence continues to be an epidemic facing our nation today.
Over 20% of all the violent victimizations between 2003 and 2012 were
attributable to domestic violence, with the greatest percentage being intimate
partner violence. 24 In addition, nearly one in three women and one in four men
25
experience physical violence by an intimate partner at some point in their life.
Though recent evidence has shown a drop in the occurrence of domestic
violence, 26 the numbers are still alarming, 27 and are likely much higher because
some claim that as many as half of the occurrences go unreported. 28

21 R. v. Malik & Bagri, 2005 B.C.S.C. 350 (Can.) (B.C.), http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdbtxt/sc/05/03/2005bcsc0350.htm.
22 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
23 Barth, supra note 16, at 939-40 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
888 (1992) ("Studies reveal that family violence occurs in two million families in the United States.
This figure, however, is a conservative one that substantially understates (because battering is not
usually reported until it reaches life-threatening proportions) the actual number of families affected ....
In fact, researchers estimate that one of every two women will be battered at some time in their life ...
24 JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 244697, NONFATAL

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2003-2012, at 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv03l2.pdf. The
following is a breakdown of violent victimizations under domestic violence: 15% by intimate partners,
4% by immediate family members, and 2% by other relatives.
25 Matthew J. Breidling et al., Prevalence and Characteristicsof Sexual Violence, Stalking, and
Intimate Partner Violence Victimization-National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey,
UnitedStates, 2011, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/

preview/mmwrhtml/ss6308al.htm?scid=ss6308al_e.
An estimated 31.5% of women and 27.5% of
men experience physical violence by an intimate partner. Id
26 SHANNON CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 239203, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993-2010, at 1 (2013),

http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid-4801

(reporting that there was a 72% decrease in

serious intimate partner violence for females and a 64% decrease in serious intimate partner violence for

males between 1994 and 2011).
27 See Buel, supranote 1, at 1329 (citing JAMES ALLAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 41, 43, 79-80 (2007),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfIhtius.pdf.). Recent data shows that the number of women murdered
by an intimate partner has stayed the same for the last two decades.
28 Raeder, supra note 1, at 326 (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178247, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000), http://www.popcenter.org/problems/

domesticviolence/PDFs/Rennison%26Welchans2000.pdf).

See also "Mary Kay's Truth About

Abuse" Survey Links Economic Downturn to NationalIncrease in Domestic Violence, MARY KAY
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According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there are four
main types of intimate partner violence: physical, sexual, stalking, and
psychological that includes both verbal and non-verbal mental or emotional
abuse. 29 Due to the nature of domestic violence, the harm is often not readily
apparent, often consisting of unseen emotional and psychological symptoms,
including depression, panic attacks, and flashbacks. 30
A. State Interest in Domestic Violence Prosecution
Although the majority of the victims of domestic violence are young, multiracial, non-Hispanic women, domestic violence is boundless 31 and is a growing
public health concern with enormous economic costs. 32 In 1995, it was estimated
that intimate partner violence cost the nation over $5.8 billion each year with the
majority being attributable to medical and mental health costs and the remaining in
lost productivity. 33 Updating these figures to only 2003, the number jumps to a
staggering $8.3 billion. 34
Due to its significant societal impact, there should be a substantial interest in
addressing the domestic violence epidemic, 35 which includes successfully
prosecuting domestic violence cases. 36 The societal benefits of domestic violence
prosecution are two-fold: prosecution is an outward manifestation of the states'
(2009), http://esuite.qa.marykay.com/en-US/About-Mary-Kay/PressRoom/PressReleases/Pages/marykays-truth-about-abuse-survey-links-economic-downtum-to-national-increase-in-domesticviolence.aspx. A survey of 600 domestic violence shelters across the United States revealed a
staggering 75% increase in female abuse victims since 2008, which may correlate to an economic
downturn. Id
29 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST

WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipvbook-a.pdf

30 Id.
31 Jennifer E. Truman & Rachel E. Morgan, Domestic Violence Accountedfor About a Fifth ofAll
Violent Victimizations Between 2003 and 2012, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/cont
ent/pub/press/ndv03l2pr.cfm. Overall, 76% of domestic violence was against females and 24% against
males. Id. In addition, domestic violence is highest in the 18- to 24-age range. Id Finally, for victims
age 12 and over, multiracial, non-Hispanics had the highest rate of domestic violence (16.5
victimizations/1000 persons). Id The following is a breakdown of rates of domestic violence for other
ethnicities: blacks had 4.7 victimizations/1000 persons; whites had 3.9 victimizations/1000 persons,
Hispanics had 2.8 victimizations/1000 persons; and other non-Hispanics had 2.3 victimizations/1000
persons. Id
32 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 29, at 13-19.
33 See Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION

(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html.
34 Wendy Max et al., The Economic Toll of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the
United States, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 259, 259 (2004).
35 See Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 307 (2005) (citing Heather Fleniken Cochran, Note, Improving Prosecutionof
Battering Partners:Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89, 95 n.38
(1997) (arguing that the harm flowing from an incident of domestic violence extends beyond the victim
to the children of the household (who may also be victims and is more likely to continue the cycle of
abuse later in life) and also the community at large)).
36 See Thekla Hansen-Young, Considering the Constitutionality of a Confrontation Clause
Exceptionfor Domestic Violence Victims, 14 BUFF. WOMEN's L.J. 81, 89 (2006) (arguing the state has
an interest in protecting the well-being of women, the most likely domestic violence victims).
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seriousness to address the domestic violence epidemic and successful prosecution
decreases the chances of victim re-abuse. 37
Recognizing the substantial interest in curtailing domestic violence, the
justice system has undergone a major reform in the past forty years. 38 The most
recent wave of reform focuses on implementing mandatory intervention procedures
for domestic violence cases, including mandatory arrest and "no-drop" policies. 3 9
While it is evident that these mandatory intervention policies have increased the
number of domestic violence cases that enter the justice system, 40 the ultimate
success of the policies is debatable because if the arrested offender is not
prosecuted and convicted, the victim will likely not be in a safer position. 4 1
B. ProsecutorialChallenges in Domestic Violence Cases
Domestic violence prosecutions have inherent challenges, most notably, the
high prevalence of the victim's recantation or sheer refusal to testify. 42 There are
normally very few witnesses to domestic violence incidents and the defendant, who
is often shielded by the Fifth Amendment privilege, is the only witness, other than
the victim, to hear the victim's statements. 43 As such, the victim's participation in

37 Id. at 90.
38 Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case But Divorcing
the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 196-98 (2008) (citing State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367,
368 (N.C. 1879) ("It is settled law of this state that the courts will not invade the domestic form or
interfere with the right of a husband to control or govern his family. . . ."); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60,
61-62 (N.C. 1874) ("It is better to draw the curtains, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to
forget and forgive."); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9-13 (1999)).
Historically, there was minimal intervention for domestic violence because it was considered a private
matter within the family. Starting in the 1970's and into the 1980's, spurred by the Women's Rights
Movement, many states started to adopt criminal and civil remedies for domestic violence. Id at 19697. Although the majority of states codified the criminality of domestic violence, these reforms did not
mandate that the justice system take any action. Id.
39 Kohn, supra note 38, at 199. Jurisdictions adopting a mandatory arrest policy statutorily
command their police oflicers to make arrests when probable cause is found in a domestic violence
cases. Id Similarly, in "io-drop" jurisdictions, the discretion of the prosecutor is eliminated because
policy mandates that all charged domestic violence cases be pursued. Id
40 Id (citing Renee Romkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 265, 265 (2001)).
41 See id. at 237 (arguing that for a mandatory arrest policy to be beneficial to the victim, a
jurisdiction needs to have the resources to handle the likely increase in caseload).
42 See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEx. L. REV. 271, 281
(2006) (citing People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (reporting approximately 80% of domestic
violence victims do not cooperate with the prosecutor's efforts in prosecuting the abusers)). See also
Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of
Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 236 (2005) (citing Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting
Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the
Dynamics ofAbusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 139 n.108 (1991) (reporting that 96% of
domestic violence victims in some jurisdictions refuse to cooperate with the prosecution)).
43 See Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to
Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2002) (citing Donna M. Matthews, Making the Crucial Connection: A Proposed
Threat Hearsay Exception, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 138 (1997)).
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the prosecution against the abuser is paramount and can prevent a case from being
dismissed. 44
The controlling and violent nature of domestic violence leads many victims
to recant. 45 Victims are often threatened with further violence from their abusers
during prosecution, 46 or alternatively, met with extreme flattery to encourage
recantation. 47 In addition to the threat of violence and intimidation, there are other
reasons for victim recantation: financial dependence on the defendant, pressure
from friends and family, love for the defendant and a hope that he or she will
48
improve, and having children with the defendant.
Due to the high likelihood that the victim witness will be "unavailable"
because of recantation or refusal to testify, it is not uncommon for domestic
violence prosecutions to be carried out without the victim. 49 Pre-Crawford, these
so-called "victimless prosecutions" relied heavily on many forms of hearsay,
including victim statements made to 911 operators and police. 50 However, with
current uncertainty surrounding the admissibility of the non-testifying victim's
statements, Crawford may have the unfortunate impact of reversing the nation's
51
long and hard fought battle of domestic violence reform.
C. ProsecutorialChallenges Compounded Post-Crawford
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford further magnified the inherent
challenges facing domestic violence prosecution and threatened the ability of the
government to pursue "victimless" prosecutions successfully. 52 First, victims are
less likely to report the abuse because of the legal obstacles that await them,
including threats of and actual imprisonment for refusal to cooperate with the

44 See Percival, supra note 42, at 236 (citing Neal A. Hudders, Note, The Problem of Using
Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: Is a New Exception the Answer?, 49 DuKE L.J. 1041, 1047

(2000)).
4S See Brown, 94 P.3d at 577-78.

The intimate and strong emotional relationship between the

abuser and victim creates a sense of loyalty that the victim affords the abuser. Id at 575. This loyalty
causes the victim to protect the abuser by recanting the statement or refusing to testify. Id.
46 See Lininger, supra note 8, at 769 (citing Randall Fritzler & Lenore Simon, Creatinga Domestic
Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 33 (2000) (reporting that one study found that

over half of the victims of domestic abuse are threatened with retaliatory abuse)).
47 Id. at 751-52.
48 Id.
49 King-Ries, supra note 35, at 301. "Victimless" prosecution is also known as evidence-based
prosecution. Id.
50 Id.; see also Lininger, supra note 8, at 820 (reporting that before Crawford, a majority of district

attorney offices in California, Oregon, and Washington reported that their offices relied on hearsay in
over 50% of domestic violence cases).
51 See Percival, supra note 42, at 217 (citing Nathan Max, Domestic Violence on Decline, PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 21, 2004 at Al).
52 See id. at 216-17 (citing Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases

at Issue as Judges Consider which Evidence to Allow, A.B.A. J., Sept. 12, 2004, at 22, 24 (observing
that since Crawford, there has been much confusion in the lower courts on how to successfully
prosecute domestic violence cases, resulting in many dropped cases)).
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prosecution. 53

9

Prosecutors recognize the importance of the victim participation

and may take extreme measures to ensure it. 54 In addition, some abusers use their
awareness of the increased likelihood of a case being dismissed when victims fail
to testify to dissuade their victims from contacting the police in the first place. 55
Second, because abusers recognize the importance of the victim testimony at
trial, they are incentivized to taunt, scare, and otherwise intimidate their victims to
ensure recantation or their "unavailability" for trial.5 6 Witness tampering, such as
this, is prolific and extremely damaging in domestic violence cases, both to the
success of the prosecution and the harm to the victim. 57 Lastly, prosecutorial
resources and overall judicial economy are threatened with the enhanced
confrontation protection that Crawford provides. 58 Domestic violence defendants
are now more likely to go to trial versus take a plea deal, as they did much more
readily pre-Crawford.59
Domestic violence prosecution has shouldered the brunt of the impact felt by
Crawford and its progeny. 6 0 The uncertainty of the admissibility of the nontestifying victim's statement has made it essential for the prosecution to have
victim participation. However, many domestic violence offenders recognize this
importance and use it to their benefit. Thus, without the victim, many more
domestic violence cases are dropped. 6 1
II. PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGIES

In light of such practical concerns for both witnesses and victims, prosecutors
have pressed for ways in which the actual "physical" component of the
Confrontation Clause might be dispensed with. 62 Accordingly, as the notion of

53 Id at 241. Victims with knowledge of the criminal justice system will be less trustful of
prosecutors and fear of their own prosecution for refusal to testify could prevent domestic violence
victims from coming forward because of adverse implications on later child custody or family court
proceedings.
54 Id
55 Buel, supra note 1, at 1331 (reporting that some abusers actually explain to their victims that the
case is likely to be dropped if they do not appear in court).
56 Lininger, supra note 42, at 300 (citing Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A
Panaceafor Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions,39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 459 (2006)).

57 Buel, supra note 1, at 1323-33 (citing Andrew King-Ries, An Argument for Original Intent:
Restoring Rule 801(D)(1)(A) to ProtectDomestic Violence Victims in a Post-Crawford World, 27 PACE
L. REv. 199, 217 (2007)). Witness tampering is the "most common crime committed by batterers;"
however, it is rarely prosecuted. Id. at 1322.
58 Lininger, supra note 42, at 297.
59 Id. (citing Lininger, supra note 8, at 820). A study of district attorney's offices in Oregon,
Washington, and Califomia found that 59% of domestic violence defendants are less likely to plead
guilty post-Crawford. Id.
60 Percival, supra note 42, at 216.

61 Lininger, supra note 8, at 820. Jurisdictions in Oregon, Washington, and California are
dismissing around 75% of charges. Percival, supra note 42, at 217. In addition, as a result of the
Crawford decision, one jurisdiction has dismissed up to a dozen domestic violence cases a day because
of the victim's refusal to participate in the prosecution. Lininger, supra note 8, at 772.
62 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (opining that "general rules of the law of this
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physical confrontation gradually became equated with the right to crossexamine 63-a witness who was physically in the courtroom during a trial was
obviously available for cross-examination-a legal evolution occurred in which
cross-examination rather than physical presence became the keystone of
compliance with the Confrontation Clause. 64 However, further evolution resulted
in the substitution of "inherent reliability" for the right of cross-examination
itself-presumably on the theory that cross-examination was only required for less
than reliable testimony, but not for out of court statements that were "inherently
reliable." This process culminated in the case of Ohio v. Roberts in which the
Supreme Court set forth two basic requirements for admitting uncross-examined
prior statements into evidence against an accused: (1) unavailability of the
testifying witness at trial; 65 and (2) a finding of reliability of the out of court

kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case"). The Chambers' Court "recognized that
competing interests, if 'closely examined,' . . . may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial."
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Deborah Epstein, ProceduralJustice: Tempering the
State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (observing that
prosecutors ramped up domestic violence charges and no-drop policies in the 1990s in response to
"monumental" societal obstacles). One might conclude that Crawford responded by reasserting the
origins of the Confrontation Clause in a stricter sense and that the Court in Giles similarly tempered
hearsay rule exemptions by denying the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception when the defendant's intent
was not addressed by the court. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). Thus, as in O.J.
Simpson's trial for the murder of his wife, the murdered victim's journal was excluded. In response, the
state enacted section 1370 of the California Code of Evidence, which would admit witnesses' statements
to police but which was usurped by Crawford. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (1997). See Melissa Moody,
Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the "Testimonial Statements" Test in Crawford, 11 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 387, 397 n.59 (2005). Thereafter, the Court in Davis v. Washington and Michigan v.
Bryant limited the admissibility of 911 calls for unavailable witnesses. See Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 826-28 (2006); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361-78 (2011). See also Percival, supra
note 42, at 234 n. 118 (noting that an interview with the Head Deputy of the L.A. County District
Attorney reported post-Crawford threats to arrest domestic violence victims in order to secure
testimony). Therefore, the current relationship of domestic violence cases within the realm of criminal
procedure, where the rights of victims are at odds with those of the defendant, is tenuous and arguably
unjust. While a court should effect all of a defendant's constitutional rights, including that of
confrontation, it is irrational to expect domestic violence victims, frequently the only witnesses to the
crime, to confront their abusers, particularly when they are deceased or in danger. See, e.g., LENORE
WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS, 42-45, 55-

70 (1989) (explaining the cycle of domestic violence).
63 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 ("[The Clause envisions 'a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."')).
6 The Court in California v. Green stated that face-to-face confrontation "forms the core of the
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970). Crossexamination, however, is "a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause]." Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965)).
65 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 719 (1900)).
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statement, which in turn could be satisfied by it meeting the requirements of a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, 6 6 or other indicia of reliability. 67
In 2004, the Supreme Court abruptly put a stop to the evolution of the law of
confrontation along the lines of Roberts in Crawford v. Washington.68 Rejecting
the entire notion that any mere "indicia of reliability" 69 could ever serve as a
constitutional substitute for the basic right of cross-examination itself,70 the Court
stated clearly that "[t]he Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless .. . the defendant had had
a prior opportunity for cross examination." 7 1 Significant in this quote is the word
"prior," suggesting that the cross-examination necessary to comply with
confrontation need not be at the trial itself, but could be performed by the
defendant prior to trial. Indeed, as early as in the case of California v. Green in
1970, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the availability of crossexamination of a witness prior to trial would not satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. 72 Rather, according to the Court, what was important in terms of the
Confrontation Clause, was not the timing of the cross examination, but rather
whether the cross-examination, whenever conducted, challenged "whether the
declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether the
declarant accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether
the declarant's intended message is adequately conveyed by the language he
employed."7
Indeed, there is evidence that the most effective cross-examination is that
which is conducted very soon after the events to which the witness testifies. 74 A
6 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244 ("[H]earsay exceptions rest upon such
solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of
the constitutional protection."').
67 Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213 ("The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there 'are
indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,' and to 'afford the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the statement.' It is clear from these statements, and from
numerous prior decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony
must bear some of these 'indicia of reliability' ....
(internal citations omitted)).
68 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
69 Id. at 60.
70

Id.

7' Id. at 54.
72 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) ("For Porter's statement at the preliminary
hearing had already been given under circumstances closely approximating those that surround the
typical trial. Porter was under oath; respondent was represented by counsel-the same counsel in fact
who later represented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to
his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a
judicial record of the hearings.").
73 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 71 (1980) (citing David Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and
the Co-ConspiratorException in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REV.
1378, 1378 (1972)). The Roberts Court looked to the principal purpose of cross-examination being
satisfied in order to comport with the Confrontation Clause. Id.
74 Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Semantic Integrationof Verbal Information Into a Visual Memory, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 19, 19, 24-25 (1978) (cited in Maria S. Zaragoza et al., Misinformation
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cross examination conducted at the trial itself, which may take place many months,
or even years, after the event to which the witness testifies, is less likely to be
effective given that the witness may have honest lapses of memory, or in the case
of a witness inclined to prevaricate or lie, have considerable time to get his story
straight or make it more bulletproof.75
In this regard, it may be useful to note that in criminal cases, there is
generally no proceeding similar to the taking of depositions in civil cases in which
a witness's statement may be preserved long before the trial, 76 and discovery is
strictly limited. 77 Indeed, a defense counsel in a criminal case generally has no
right to even interview prosecution witnesses before trial, 78 and savvy prosecutors
are often quite adept at insuring that their witnesses' statements remain oral and,
thus, are not available in written form to defense counsel, under even a typical
prosecutor's generous "open file" policy. 79 It is true that preliminary hearings in
felony cases may give a defense counsel an opportunity to cross-examine a
prosecution witness, but given the low burden of proof in such hearings and the
dubious chance to win the case at that stage, the defense uses this "opportunity for

Effects and the Suggestibility of Eyewitness Memory, in Do JUSTICE AND LET THE SKY FALL:
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS AND HER CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE, LAW, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 35-63

(Maryanne Gary & Harlene Hayne eds., 2006)).
75 Domestic violence victims may refresh their memory by their prior written statements though
their memory need not be perfect so as to result in conviction. See State v. Widder, No. 21383, 2003
WL 21697868, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 23, 2003). See also Smith v. State, 684 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. CL
App. 2009) (victims of aggravated assault were treated as hostile witnesses by prosecutor due to their
lack of memory). In one case of incest, a thirteen year old did not testify about molestation that
occurred when she was nine years old and had trouble remembering upon multiple depositions what had
in fact occurred, and the Supreme Court of Florida found that the state's discovery deposition
evidentiary rule was insufficient to meet the Crawford confrontation standard because the defendant was
not present and could not cross-examine her. State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008). Otherwise,
according to one expert, a domestic violence "victim might come to court and either minimize what
occurred or deny that any physical contact took place. The vast majority of victims are reluctant to
testify against their abusers. The victim might also have selective memory when testifying or lie under
oath to help the abuser." People v. Moore, No. Bl81862, 2006 WL 990374, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
17, 2006).
76 Affidavits are functional witnesses, thus absent a showing that the affiant is unavailable to testify
at trial or there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, the Confrontation Clause would be
violated by an affidavit's admission not accompanied by the affiant. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009) (stating, "the sky will not fall" under this holding as the states had served as
laboratories).
77 Discovery, while neither a constitutional right nor available except by motion, is subject to FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16 (stating repeatedly, "upon a defendant's request, the government must disclose . . ."
relevant discovery) and the Brady rule. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. . .").
78 Defense counsel is limited to the witness list per FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G) and FED R. EVID.
702.
79 Discovery is not constitutionally founded, though the Brady rule requires divulgence of
exculpatory or mitigating evidence to comply with the defendant's due process right to a fair trial and
jurisdictional rules, including court rules and professional conduct rules adopted by states, require
disclosure of certain information during discovery. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2011) (stating that prosecutors are subject to discipline for
abusive investigatory practices and discovery abuses).
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cross-examination" less often for purposes of actually impeaching or discrediting a
witness-and thus alerting both the witness and prosecutor to counsel's crossexamination techniques likely to be used at trial. Instead, its use is as a substitute
for a deposition in which the primary motive for cross-examination is not to
discredit or impeach the witness, but rather to garner information and pin down the
witness's testimony.80 Even where a defense counsel is prepared to pull out all the
stops in discrediting a witness in hopes of gaining dismissal, the lapse of as much
as thirty days from the event to which the witness if testifying detracts from the
effectiveness of the cross-examination.
Furthermore, the prosecution is not
obligated to call all of his witnesses at the preliminary hearing, and may not do so
if he is confident that a single witness will be sufficient to show probable cause. Of
course, there is no opportunity for the defense to cross-examine a witness in a
grand jury proceeding, or to cross-examine any of the prosecution's future
81
witnesses.
III. CRAWFORD AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE PHYSICAL COMPONENT OF
CONFRONTATION

A. Pre-CrawfordConfrontationLaw: Ohio v. Roberts
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." 82 Long before the current Confrontation Clause was
written, an accused had the right to confront his witness. 83 The Confrontation
84
Clause stems from English common law, where live testimony was traditional.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court incorporated the hearsay rules of evidence into the

80 Although the Constitution guarantees that the states hold neither a grand jury indictment nor a
preliminary hearing, the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of probable cause within 48 hours
of a defendant's custody. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,45 (1991).
81 Grand jury proceedings occur without judge where the interested prosecutor and the jurors
themselves play a quasi-judicial role, the proceedings are sealed, and the defendant neither has
representation nor is typically permitted to be aware of the proceeding's existence. See U.S. CONsT.
amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ."). Grand juries follow FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. Their
purpose is "to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a formal accusation against a
person" and to "stand between the government and the person being investigated by the government"
thus ensuring innocent persons are not subject to trial specifically should not be "an instrument of
private prejudice, vengeance, or malice." Judicial Conference of the United States, Model Grand Jury
Charge, paras. 19-20 (Mar. 2005), http://cldc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/model-gj-charge.pdf
(stating that, "[o]rdinarily, neither the person being investigated by the government nor any witnesses on
behalf of that person will testify before the Grand Jury" and "witnesses are not permitted to have a
lawyer present with them in the Grand Jury room"). See also DeCamp v. Douglas Cty. Franklin Grand
Jury, 987 F.2d 1047, 1050 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991) (reiterating that grand jurors play a quasi-judicial role and
also stating that grand jurors, as a discretionary instrument, possess absolute immunity as protection
from reprisal or intimidation).
82 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
83 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
84

Id
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principle of confrontation, and set forth a test which upheld the admissibility of
prior uncross-examined statements if: (1) the witness was not available; and (2) the
statements met "indicia of reliability" by falling within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. 85
In Roberts, the accused was charged with forging a check and possessing
stolen credit cards. 86 He argued that the victim's daughter gave him the credit
cards and allowed him to use the checkbook. 8 7 In a preliminary hearing, the
witness stated that she did not provide Roberts with the credit cards or access to the
checkbooks. 88 She later absconded, and, despite the efforts of her parents and the
prosecuting attorney, could not be available at trial as a witness. 8 9 The question
eventually presented to the Supreme Court was whether testimony from a witness,
the victims' daughter, should be admitted as evidence. 90 The constitutional
question behind this issue is whether the admission of this prior testimony would
violate the Confrontation Clause. 9 1 Taken literally, the Confrontation Clause
would exclude every statement in which the prosecuting witness did not physically
confront the accused. 92 The Roberts Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause
may
was meant to exclude some hearsay evidence, but "competing interests ...
warrant with dispensing with confrontation at trial." 9 3 The interpretation of the
Clause in this case regards the instance when witnesses are unavailable for direct
confrontation at trial. 94
Relying on a compilation of prior Supreme Court holdings, the Roberts Court
reasoned that exceptions should exist 95 to the strict reading of the Clause, 96 and
should allow trustworthy hearsay from unavailable witnesses. 97 The Court held
that witness statements are admissible if that witness is unavailable at trial 98 and
the statements "bear adequate indicia of reliability." 9 9 Furthermore, the Court
85 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).

86

Id. at 58.

87 Id. at 59.
88 Id. at 58.
89 Id. at 59-60.
90 Id. at 58.

9'

Id at 62.
92 Christine Hoist, Note, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process
Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599, 1601 (2010).
93 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64. These competing interests are set forward in a non-exhaustive way by
the Roberts Court. Id. at 64-65. The mobility of the public demands some concessions from the
judiciary. Witnesses may move, become unavailable, or refuse to testify after making a preliminary
statement.
94 Id. at 58.
95 Id. at 65. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("[G]eneral rules . . . must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.").
96 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65; see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
97 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
98 Id. at 65-66 ("The prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant."); see also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204 (1972).
99 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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directly connected the Confrontation Clause to hearsay exceptions by stating that
reliability is established if the statement fits within a hearsay exception. 10 0 Even in
instances outside of hearsay exceptions, evidence can be admitted if it is clearly
trustworthy as a matter of law. 10 1 The Roberts Court decided to leave the question
of the opportunity for or actual cross-examination for a later date.
The Supreme Court in Roberts, however, did make some interesting
statements regarding testimony and confrontation at preliminary hearings. 102 In
Roberts, the defendant extensively cross-examined the relevant witness, but prior
rulings hinted at the fact that the opportunity for cross-examination would suffice
for Confrontation Clause challenges. 103 In contrast, the Crawford Court examined
Calfornia v. Green, in which evidence was permitted in trial after the defendant
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during a preliminary hearing, but
did not choose to do so. 104 Under this test reliability and an opportunity for crossexamination satisfied the Confrontation Clause. 10 5
The Supreme Court created a new standard in Crawford.106 Before
Crawford, the courts allowed evidence that passed the reliability test, created in
Roberts.10 7 This test was satisfied if the witness was unavailable to testify for any
reason, and his or her statements were reliable as a matter of law. 10 8 A reasonable
litmus test for the success of a test like the Roberts test is whether the test is
reliable and predictable. Crawford appeared before the Supreme Court solely due
to the unpredictability of the Roberts test.
B. Crawford v. Washington: Addressing Unpredictabilityof the Roberts Test
The facts in Crawford v. Washingtonl09 perfectly demonstrated the problems
with the Roberts test.1 10 In Crawford, the prosecution tried to admit evidence, in
the form of statements to the police, from the defendant's wife. 111 This evidence
consisted of statements made to the police after an altercation between her husband
and another man. 112 Applying the Roberts test, the Washington State Superior

100 See id.
101 See id at 70; see also Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213.
102 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70.
103 Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontationas ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure: Crawford'sBirth Did
Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 685, 687 (2007). Roberts extensively crossexamined his adverse witness during a preliminary hearing.
10 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004); see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
105 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
106 Id. at 68-69.
107 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

los Id

109 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
110 See id. at 36.

I Id. at 38.
Id

112
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Court allowed the evidence, and Crawford was convicted of first-degree assault. 113
In the court's view, the statements had "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness," and thus had the required "indicia of reliability" of the Roberts
test.l 14 Crawford appealed the allowance of his wife's statements to the police,
and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed. 115 This court applied a nine-factor
test to examine the trustworthiness of the statements,1 16 and reasoned that the
statement contradicted one made previously. 117 The Washington Court of Appeals
held that the statement did not have "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 1 1 8 On review, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the trial court's verdict. 19 The Washington Supreme Court held that the
statements did not fall within hearsay exceptions, but did have guarantees of
trustworthiness. 120
Furthermore, the court held that the statements were
trustworthy under a rationale similar to the justification for reversal in the appellate
court.1 2 1 The witness's statements were similar to those made by the defendant;
thus, they were deemed reliable. 122 This reliability exists even though the
statements contradicted regarding the most important facts of the event in question.
All three lower courts applied the facts of the case to the test, and ended with
conflicting results. 123 The court also noted each result could be acceptable under
the Roberts test. 124 The Supreme Court allowed for the creation of a new approach
to the Confrontation Clause that was both reliable and predictable.
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court took a textual approach to its
reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause. The first question presented by Justice
Scalia in the Supreme Court's opinion "is whether this [case] complied with the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee that, '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'1 2 5 The
historical approach to the Confrontation Clause relies on the confrontation itself as
the guarantor of trustworthiness, 126 with confrontation coming in the vein of cross-

113 Id at 41.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 40.
Id. at41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at40.
Id
Id. at 41.
Id
Id.
See id
Id

125 Id. at 38; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

126 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). Although the Craig Court appealed to
history with the statement of confrontation being the guarantor of trustworthiness, the Court found an
exception for alleged child abuse victims. Id. Like the Roberts Court that dispensed with face-to-face
confrontation for practical and policy reasons, the Craig Court allowed closed-circuit televisions to
serve as the vehicle for testimony during trial. Id at 855-56. This approach, unlike the absent witness
in Roberts, affords the jury the opportunity to see and examine the witness, albeit from a closed-circuit
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examination.1 27 The historical motivations for the Sixth Amendment include in
large part this reimagining of the Confrontation Clause. 128 This application of the
Confrontation Clause allows for some flexibility as to statements and witness
appearances in court, but it is not as broad as the Roberts test. Witnesses that are
unavailable to appear in court may have their statements admitted, 129 but only if
they were previously subjected to cross-examination or their statements were nontestimonial. 130
Although the Supreme Court clarified the Confrontation Clause in Crawford
by eradicating the Roberts indicia of reliability test, it created a new ambiguity for
cases that would involve the Confrontation Clause. The Crawford Court created a
spectrum for the testimonial vis-A-vis non-testimonial scale, without establishing a
test to determine whether a specific statement or piece of evidence fell under either
title. The Court left this ambiguity for later courts to fill in as public policy and the
facts of a particular case necessitate. 13 1 The Crawford rule does not allow
testimonial statements to be used as evidence without the opportunity for crossexamination. 132 The Supreme Court noted that it would not state the test for a
testimonial statement, 133 but reasoned that the facts of the case before the Court
certainly satisfied any future test that the nature of the statements were
testimonial. 134 The witness made statements to the police after the conclusion of
the events. 135 This witness certainly knew that her statements would be utilized in
the proceedings of the predictable criminal trial. 136 Thus, the Crawford Court
37
gives one example of a testimonial statement: one made to the police.1

feed. The Craig Court believed that the use of a closed-circuit feed satisfied the goals of both the
contact portion of the Confrontation Clause and the policy goals of protecting vulnerable witnesses. Id.
at 855-57.
127 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). The defendant in this case was under oath,
represented by counsel, and was available for cross-examination. Id The court reasoned that his
statements met the criteria for suitable confrontation if he was unavailable for trial. Id.
128 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
129 Id. at 59.

130 See Sheckles v. State, 24 N.E.3d 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The trial court admitted video
evidence regarding an alleged drug purchase. Id. at 987. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the
admission of this video evidence was non-testimonial, but even testimonial video or photographic
evidence could be admitted with the opportunity for cross-examination. Id
131 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
132 Id at 68-69.
133 Id. at 68.

134 See also State v. DeLeon, 341 P.3d 315, 333-35 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). The defendants did not
have the opportunity to cross-examine the testimony regarding gang documentation forms. Id. These
forms, however, were found to be non-testimonial because the individual did not act as a witness against
the defendant. Id.
135 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.

136 See State v. Payne, 104 A.3d 142, 163 (Md. Ct. App. 2014) (further discussing the Crawford
approach to deciding an issue of whether evidence is testimonial). Testimonial evidence included police
interrogations and statements made before the court. Id. at 164. Furthermore, wiretapped conversations

are non-testimonial, therefore their inclusion did not violate the defendant's Confrontation rights. Id.
137 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 66 (discussing an example of a generally non-testimonial statement, a
business record). Cf Kirksey v. Alabama, CR-09-1091, 2014 WL 7236987, at *32 (Ala. Crim. App.
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C. Post-CrawfordConfrontation Law
As to Crawford's progeny, those cases set forward the factors that make
statements testimonial in nature. Statements are deemed testimonial when the
person making them has a reason to believe that the statements would or could
appear as testimony in a courtroom. 138
Since the tactics of using hearsay
exceptions and the indicia of reliability were necessarily abandoned after the
Crawford ruling, prosecutors had to find a new way to use witness testimony
outside of the standard trial appearance. Many tried to expand the category of nontestimonial statements, since the only testimonial statement afforded was a
statement made to the police. 139 The Crawford holding only applied the
Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements.1 4 0 Non-testimonial statements
were still examined under hearsay rules, 14 1 with possibly even less of a barrier than
the Roberts test.
In addition to defining "testimony" for application in a Confrontation Clause
analysis, one later case also shifted the ambiguity from the term "testimony" to
"emergency."142 In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court created a loophole
for statements that a witness could reasonably believe would end up as evidence in
court. 143 Under this new rule, statements made in emergency situations are
regarded as non-testimonial.1 44 The Davis Court reasoned that people in those
circumstances do not act as witnesses, 14 5 since their statements allow law
enforcement to meet an ongoing emergency. 146 The Court further noted that

Dec. 19, 2014). A business record-type document can be testimonial if the author acts as a witness
against the alleged perpetrator. In this case, the record was inadmissible because the document was
testimonial and the defendant had no opportunity for the requisite cross-examination. Kirksey, 2014 WL
7236987, at *31-32.
138 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
139
140
141

Id. at 68.
Id
Id.

142 G. Kristian Miccio, What's Truth Got to Do with It? A Deontological Critique and Response to
Tom Lininger's Article Reconceptualizing ConfrontationAfter Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 39, 43 (2007)
(citing Lininger, supra note 42, at 280). Although many court opinions treat the Confrontation Clause
as a truth-seeking enterprise, the justice system is adversarial in nature, and confrontation fits within that
paradigm. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity to undermine a prosecutor's case, be it
with the truth or by injection of reasonable doubt into any potential jurors.
143 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
144 Id. at 828. In Davis, a domestic violence victim called 911 during the attack. Id. at 817. She
identified her attacker to the 911 operator, and the prosecution used this information during trial. Id.
The identification was during the scope of an emergency. Id. at 828. In this line of cases, it thus
incentivized treating a period of emergency as a long length of time, because more evidence could be
presented in court. In fact, evidence during a single interaction can change from testimonial to nontestimonial.
145
146

Id

Id; see also United States v. Liera-Morales, 759 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2014). This case
regarding an ongoing hostage situation also falls within the emergency doctrine established by the Davis
Court. The primary purpose of the call was to allow agents to respond to the hostage situation, even
though the provided information also included statements about past events. Id. The court reasoned that
these statements, even though not solely current, were made with the intention of resolving the hostage
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statements could become testimonial during the course of an interaction between
law enforcement and potential witnesses. 147 Thus, this holding refines the only
example given in Crawford, providing a non-testimonial exception to statements

made to the police.

Although the focus of the analysis still remains with the

testimonial nature of statements, many cases after Davis relied on statements made
during the course of an emergency. 14 8 The emergency doctrine also applies in
149
situations in which the witness is not the individual facing the emergency.
Furthermore, a new approach to using statements that would not normally
pass under the Crawford test is the use of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
After Crawford, testimonial statements that had not been subjected to crossexamination would be admitted under two exceptions, dying declarations and
forfeiture by wrongdoing.1 50 Dying declarations have routinely been admitted
under Confrontation Clause challenges.1 5 1 In addition, testimonial statements may
be admitted if the defendant, by his or her own wrongdoing, forfeited the right to
confronting the witnesses against them. 152 The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
may allow many statements made by domestic violence victims, due to the fact that
the acts in question could be construed to entail the required specific intent to

crisis. Id.
147 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
148 See State v. Hill, 336 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). Although many cases rely on the
declaration of evidence as non-testimonial through the emergency situation doctrine, many useful pieces
of evidence can fall under the exception for medical examinations. In this case, a medical professional
performed an exam after the victim was assaulted. Id. at 1285. Although the court reasoned that the
situation was no longer a pressing emergency, the general justification behind the emergency situation
doctrine still applied. Id. at 1288-89. (The medical professional desired to gain information relevant to
the exam and the patient's health.) Thus, this non-testimonial sphere of evidence includes many sources
during the course of a normal investigation.
149 See State v. Falkins, 146 So. 3d 838, 848 (La. Ct. App. 2014). In this case, three separate callers
made 911 calls during the course of an attempted break-in. Id. The first call came from an individual
inside the apartment, who happened to be the defendant's girlfriend. Id. The second call came from the
apartment security worker, who saw the defendant trying to kick open the door to an apartment. Id. The
third call came from the victim's sister, who also happened to be inside the apartment. Id. The court
held that all three calls fell under the emergency doctrine, because the information given to the 911
operator was intended to aid in the resolution of an ongoing emergency. Id. at 848-49. The court
reasoned that the information was presented as an account of current events, not as a statement of the
past that would qualify the statements as testimonial. Id. Although the first and third callers were
indisputably facing an ongoing emergency, the apartment security guard was not in immediate danger or
an integral figure in the emergency in question. Id. Nonetheless, the security guard's statements were
allowed into evidence as non-testimonial statements outside the Crawford requirements for further
confrontation.
150 Michael Vargas, ProsecutingDomestic Violence After Giles: Why a CategoricalApproach to the
ForfeitureDoctrine ThreatensFemaleAutonomy, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 173, 173 (2012).
151 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 n.6 (2004).
152 Brittain v. State, 766 S.E.2d 106, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). An abduction victim, and also a
witness to the murder of her husband, went missing during the scope of the investigation into the named
defendant. Id. at 108-10. Her calls to friends immediately after she escaped her abductor, as well as her
911 call upon arriving safely at the nearest payphone, were allowed as evidence without the question of
whether those calls were testimonial or non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 111 n. 15. The court followed
the precedent of the forfeiture doctrine and reasoned that the conduct of the defendant eliminated his
Confrontation rights. Id. at 113.
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alienate witnesses. 153 There are many challenges to this approach to prosecuting
domestic violence cases. In effect, the defendant would be held guilty of the acts
for which he or she is on trial to admit evidence. 154
Recently, the Supreme Court further discussed Crawford and the
Confrontation Clause in light of testimonial and non-testimonial statements. 155
The question in Ohio v. Clark was whether statements made by a three-year-old
child were testimonial in nature, therefore implicating the Confrontation Clause
under Crawford.156 The lower courts disagreed on whether the statements made to
a teacher regarding abuse at home were testimonial. 157 In holding that the
statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court noted the
relevant factors for consideration.
Statements made by children, especially
children as young as the abused in this case, "rarely, if ever, implicate the
Confrontation Clause," 15 8 because children, and the witness in this case, cannot
159
have the purpose of making statements for future use in a criminal proceeding.
In addition, the teacher who received and acted upon the statements was not a law
enforcement officer, and did not have the primary goal of responding to the current
situation for the safety of the child. 160 Crawford provided a new template for the
Confrontation Clause, with the Supreme Court and lower courts defining the
necessary terms for its current application.
IV. A PROPOSED CRA WFORD-COMPLIANT PROCEDURE: THE PROMPT POST-ARREST
CONFRONTATION HEARING

Two facts, thus, demonstrate the appropriateness of an alternative Crawfordcompliant approach, which will serve to address the concerns of witness safety,
particularly in domestic violence cases: the most productive cross-examination is
likely to be the one closest in time to the events to which the witness will testify,
and the specific recognition in Crawford and Green that the opportunity to cross16 1
examine "prior" to trial satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
153 Vargas, supra note 150, at 175.
154 Id. at 180.

155 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
156 Id. at 2177.
157 Id. at 2178 ("Clark moved to exclude testimony about L.P.'s out-of-court statements under the
Confrontation Clause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that L.P.'s responses were not
testimonial statements covered by the Sixth Amendment.. . . Clark appealed his conviction, and a state
appellate court reversed on the ground that the introduction of L.P.'s out-of-court statements violated the
Confrontation Clause. In a 4-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. It held that, under this
Court's Confrontation Clause decisions, L.P.'s statements qualified as testimonial because the primary
purpose of the teachers' questioning 'was not to deal with an existing emergency but rather to gather
evidence potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution."' (internal citations omitted)).
188 Id. at 2182.
159 Id. at 2181.
160 Id. at 2182 ("It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very
different from that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality.").
161 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (finding that the confrontation clause could be
satisfied if the witness was "unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
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In the aftermath of Crawford v. Washington1 62 and Davis v. Washington, 163
prosecutors are anxious to protect their witnesses from intimidation, coercion, or
wrongdoing to prevent their appearance in court. Thus, they have resorted to three
main legal strategies: (1) making the case to the court that the uncross-examined,
out of court statement they want to introduce is not "testimonial," 1 64 citing the
Crawford principle that non-testimonial statements are excluded from application
of the Confrontation Clause; 165 (2) offering evidence to the court purporting to
show that the defendant "engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying," citing the 2008 Supreme Court case of Giles v. Calfornia; 166 or (3) in
the rare cases to which it applies, the Dying Declaration, 167 citing Crawford's

.

cross-examination"); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970) ("'[T]here may be some
justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing
satisfies the demand of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable .
. .,'" as support of a conclusion that "respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine [the defendant]
as to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a
judicial record of the hearings. Under these circumstances, [defendant's] statement would . . . have been
admissible at trial even in [defendant's] absence if [defendant] had been actually unavailable, despite
good faith efforts of the State to produce him. That being the case, [the Court does] not think a different
result should follow where the witness is actually produced." (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 72526 (1968)). Courts have held that prior testimony from preliminary hearings or probable cause hearings
were admissible in later trial under the confrontation clause. State v. Crocker, 852 A.2d 762 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2004). Such was echoed in an unpublished California case, which overcame the objection that
"[defendant] did not have adequate opportunity to cross-examine this witness" by stating that
"[defendant] had an opportunity to cross-examine [the witness] at the preliminary hearing about the
'facts and circumstances' of the incident." People v. Sharpe, B 169924, 2004 WL 1771481, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2004). Even preliminary hearings where the attorney differed from that representing
the defendant at trial did not disqualify cross-examination because the defendant was the common
denominator, according to one unpublished Michigan case. People v. Tincher, Nos. 246891-92, 2004
WL 1460687, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004).
162 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
163 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
16 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011) (defining as outside the scope of the confrontation
clause those responses to interrogations intended to diffuse an ongoing emergency which presumably
lacks the testimonial purpose that would prescribe defendant's subjection to "the crucible of crossexamination").
165 Id.

t6 Giles' denial of forfeiture by wrongdoing is resolved by European courts as stating that, though
the accused may be innocent until proven guilty, the victims may be presumed to be actual victims
rather than alleged victims until proven otherwise such that alleged defendant is separated from alleged
accused. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358-64 (2008).
167 Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations and Modern Confrontation
Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1411, 1426 (2010) (citing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96,
104 (1933) (declarations are not necessarily reliable anyway though they may possess vital
information); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140
(1892); Price v. State, 98 P. 447, 454 (Okla. Crim. App. 1908), abrogatedby Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d
690 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (stating "[e]xperience teaches us that men do not always speak the truth in
the presence of certain death"); King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 354 (K.B. 1790) (finding
admissible a dying wife's declaration that her husband beat her, causing severe injuries). See Richard
D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection,
19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 12 (2004) (noting denial of a legitimate claim by an accused who wrongfully caused a
witness to be unavailable at trial). See also Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Essay, The Evolution of
Chutzpah as a Legal Term: The Chutzpah Championship, Chutzpah Award, Chutzpah Doctrine, and
Now, the Supreme Court, 87 KY. L.J. 417, 418 (1999) (noting the gall of the accused who killed
someone then demanded the dead victim testify against him).
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acknowledgement that this particular hearsay exception, being "sui generis," has a
rock solid common law pedigree. 168
Unfortunately for the cause of intimidated witnesses and victims of domestic
violence, none of these prosecutorial strategies has adequately addressed the
problems created by Crawford. Concededly, much data is unavailable regarding
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute domestic violence cases, or
whether the decision not to prosecute in an individual case can be attributed to
heightened confrontation standards imposed by Crawford in the aftermath of the
demise of Roberts.
As predicted by those who concurred in Crawford and foresaw in the new
"testimonial" test a new litigation flashpoint just as problematic and arbitrary in
169
the "testimonial"
application as the old "indicia of reliability" test of Roberts,
test remains in legal flux and its definition is still largely unrefined. 170 There are
two doctrines that allow admission of testimonial statements, forfeiture by
wrongdoing and dying declarations. The requirements for asserting the forfeiture
by wrongdoing standard have been set so high in Giles that most prosecutors
attempt to admit the evidence by arguing that the statements were nontestimonial. 17 1 Dying declarations, while presumably qualifying for exemption
from application of confrontation, rest primarily on dictum by the Supreme
173
Court, 172 and are applicable in only a very narrow set of circumstances.
The alternative Crawford-compliant approach for protecting witnesses and
victims consists in the following two primary elements:
1. A small courtroom located conveniently near a police station should be
constructed or set aside, and a private defense counsel or public defender

168 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
169 Id. at 75. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
170 State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 840 (Ohio 2006) ("The court in Crawford expressly declined to
define testimonial, but it did give three examples of formulations for testimonial statements that

historical analysis supports. The first deems testimonial all ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially. The second includes all extrajudicial statements contained in formalized

testimonial matters, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. And the third
includes statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted)).

171 See James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowingthe Future of Forfeiture/Estoppelby Wrongdoing: Davis
v. Washington and the Necessity of the Defendant's Intent to Intimidate the Witness, 15 J.L. & POL'Y
863, 893-94 (2007) (citing United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805, 810 (M.D. Ga. 1992), affd,
981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'don other grounds, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); State v. Washington, 521
N.W.2d 35, 42 (Minn. 1994); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)). When a
living witness refuses to testify, questions of intent apply to the decision not to cooperate. Id. Also, any
intimidation must occur concurrently with the decision not to cooperate with prosecutors or with the

litigation process. Id.
172 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899).
173 See Flanagan, supra note 171, at 888-90. This limited exception requires that the decedent
satisfy a test of knowledge and acceptance of death before the exception applies.
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retained on 24-hour call to represent an accused who has been arrested
and brought to the police station for booking. In addition, a magistrate
must also be on call. A system of notifying the prosecutor's office of an
impending hearing could also be implemented, though the prosecutor's
presence, though advisable, would be optional and not required.
2. Immediately upon either the termination of an interview with an arrested
assault or domestic violence suspect, but before release or remand to jail
pending a bond hearing, the defense counsel on call should be appointed
to represent the defendant. Then, the victim should be asked to appear at
the hearing, preferably within hours of the suspect's arrest, but in any
case as soon as practical, to make his or her statement under oath and
subject to open-ended cross-examination by the defense counsel. If the
defendant wishes to call his own attorney for purposes of the
confrontation hearing, this request should be granted if chosen counsel
can appear promptly. In addition, if the suspect declines to participate in
the hearing, he may choose to waive his right to cross-examination in
writing.
The proposed procedure satisfies not only the Crawford requirement of
"prior" opportunity for cross-examination, but also provides the opportunity for
more effective cross-examination by a defense counsel since the witness-victim
would be testifying while the events to which she is testifying are still fresh in her
mind. The possible objection that the appointed counsel does not have sufficient
time to prepare for cross-examination (by for example, researching the victim's
criminal record) is adequately addressed by Rule 806.174 In any case, the same
objection could be made to permitting the opportunity for cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing to satisfy the requirement for prior opportunity to crossexamine, but that argument has already been posed and rejected by the Supreme
Court in Green. 17 5 Thus, if the defense learns after the confrontation hearing that
the witness or victim has been convicted of a felony or made prior inconsistent
statements, the defense would have an opportunity at trial to introduce any
additional impeaching evidence it has even if the declarant does not testify at
trial. 176
It should also be noted that "unavailability" would continue to be a
requirement under the proposed procedure.1 7 7 However, the paramount feature of
the proposed procedure is that there would no longer be any incentive for a suspect
to intimidate or harass a witness, or engage in conduct that would cause the
witness-victim's unavailability. 178 The procedure would be particularly helpful in
174 FED. R. EVID. 806.
175 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
176 FED. R. EviD. 806.
177 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77 (1980).
178

Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecutionof Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal
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those "no-drop" 1 79 jurisdictions where it is required for a prosecutor to proceed
with prosecution of a domestic violence case even where the witness-victim
declines for whatever reason to cooperate with the prosecution.
V. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROMTP POST-ARREST
CONFRONTATION HEARING

An anticipated objection to the proposed prompt post-arrest confrontation
hearing is that the motive of the cross-examiner would not be sufficiently similar to
the motive that would be demonstrated at trial for the unavailable witnesses'
statements to be used as evidence. 180 If the goals at a preliminary proceeding and
subsequent trial are not similar, then the goals of that later examination could not
181
be considered satisfied, and those earlier statements should not be admitted.
In United States v. DiNapoli, the nature of the proceedings in which
questioning occurred was different, one being a grand jury proceeding and the
other being the trial. 182 The precise issue was whether the prosecutors had a
similar motive in examining two grand jury witnesses, as they would have, had the
opportunity to cross-examine at trial been available. 183 The witnesses testified to
the non-existence of a "club" implicated in a RICO proceeding. 184
The
government urged that the motive could not be similar because it was the aim of
185
the prosecutors to determine whether there should be further indictments.
During the grand jury proceeding, the prosecutors asked whether the witnesses
knew of the "club," then pressed the veracity of the witnesses' denials by bringing
up the only piece of evidence in the public record. 186 The prosecutor, however,
had more evidence that it was unwilling to present before the grand jury. 187 The

Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 205, 217-18 (1999) ("[MJany batterers . . . stop harassing their
victims" once the incentive is removed." (citing Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectiveson Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1079-80 (1996)).
179 See Robbins, supra note 178, at 217 (citing Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the
Prosecution ofDomestic Violence Cases: Guaranteeto Action or DangerousSolution?, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 853, 857 (1994)). Even though no-drop jurisdictions have a harder course of inaction, cases are
still dropped due to lack of evidence and cooperation. Id.
1so See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71. The Roberts Court asserted that the Confrontation Clause was
satisfied by the goals and objectives of cross-examination, even if cross-examination itself did not occur
at trial. Furthermore, "the principal purpose of cross-examination: to challenge 'whether the declarant
was sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether the declarant accurately perceived and
remembered the matter he related, and whether the declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed
by the language he employed."' Id. (citing Davenport, supranote 73).
181 See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1993).
182 Id. at 909.
183 Id.

184 Id. at 911.
185 Id. at 915.
186 Id at 911.
187 Id ("The prosecutor, obviously skeptical of the denials, pressed DeMatteis with a few questions
in the nature of cross-examination. However, in order not to reveal the identity of then undisclosed
cooperating witnesses or the existence of then undisclosed wiretapped conversations that refuted
DeMatteis's denials, the prosecutor refrained from confronting him with the substance of such evidence.

2015]

PROMPT POST-ARREST CONFRONTATION HEARING

25

prosecution argued that this difference included dissimilar motives in terms of
approach and overall questioning. 188
The DiNapoliCourt began its inquiry by clarifying the approach to determine
whether a party's motives were substantially similar in the way required by Rule
804(b)(1).1 89 Instead of relying upon whether a side takes the same position, the
party must have a substantially similar interest in asserting that position or side of
an issue. 19 0 Although grand jury questioning and trial proceedings are markedly
different in burdens of proof and general approach to questioning, the DiNapoli
Court rejected the government's position that a prosecutor would never have the
same motive in a trial as a grand jury interrogation.' 9 1 Furthermore, the
determination of whether there was a substantially similar motive must be fact
specific. 192 Under the proposed solution, the confrontation hearing examination
would have the substantially similar motive of discrediting the witness.1 9 3
Although the DiNapoli Court, ultimately, held that the motives were not similar
enough to allow the statements to be admissible, this decision provides a
framework for demonstrating the sufficiently similar motives inherent in the
proposed solution. 194
Another potential objection is that the cross-examiner would not have all of
the available information at the time of the examination. Although more evidence
would come to light after the initial examination, this lack of a complete record
does not affect the proposed use of these statements in a later proceeding.195 In
United States v. Koon, there was video evidence that showed the infamous arrest of
Rodney King, as well as a taped interview with one of the officers from a state
court proceeding. 196 At the time of the interview with Briseno, its key officer
Instead, the prosecutor called to DeMatteis's attention the substance of only the one relevant wiretapped
conversation that had already become public-a tape played at a prior trial." (internal citations
omitted)).
'88 Id. at 914.
189 Id. at 912; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) ("Testimony that: (A) was given as a witness at
a
trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had-or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had-an
opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination" is not excluded.).
190 Id.

191 Id. at 914.
192

Id

Id. at 914-15 ("The proper approach, therefore, in assessing similarity of motive under Rule
804(b)(1) must consider whether the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending proceeding had at
a prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a
substantially similar issue. The nature of the two proceedings-both what is at stake and the applicable
burden of proof-and, to a lesser extent, the cross-examination at the prior proceeding-both what was
undertaken and what was available but forgone-will be relevant though not conclusive on the ultimate
issue of similarity of motive.").
194 Id. at 915.
195 See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1427
(9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev d in part, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d
210, 215 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1988); Thomas v.
Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1386 n.34 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089 (1981).
196 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1426-27.
193
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witness 197 at the state court proceeding, the opposing party had the opportunity to
and did in fact cross-examine Briseno about his statements.1 98 Koon argued that
the opportunity to cross-examine was hindered because the Holliday tape
(recording King's arrest) was better developed at the time of the later
proceeding.1 99 Koon specifically argued that the examination of Briseno could
have been more complete with the enhanced video, because more information
would have changed the questioning. 200 Thus, it was argued that the prior
testimony should not be allowed as evidence because the previous crossexamination was completed with information that may have altered the course of
the questioning. 20 1
The Koon Court, however, held that the later availability of important
information did not constitute a lack of opportunity of cross-examination at an
earlier proceeding. 20 2 Specifically, having the opportunity to cross-examine is the
necessary limit to use of earlier statements as evidence, not taking full advantage of
that opportunity. 2 03 The Koon holding applies to this proposed solution because of
the inherent lack of a full evidentiary record at the time of the confrontation
hearing. The proposed solution, however, provides the necessary opportunity for
cross-examination along with the requisite substantial similarity of motives.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, holding that prior
statements of victims and witnesses are inadmissible at a criminal trial unless the
victim is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness, need not put victims at risk of intimidation, threat,
and death if, in accordance with Crawford, defendant is accorded an opportunity to
cross-examine the victim immediately upon his arrest either at the police station, at
197 Id at 1426. Briseno was one of the officers involved in the incident. Id. He was very vocal
regarding his opposition to the tactics in question. Id.

198

Id. at 1427.

199 Id.

200 Id.
201 Id. at 1426 ("At the state trial, Briseno was cross-examined by all three of his codefendants as
well as the prosecutor, who spent part of his time trying to establish Briseno's own culpability."). The
video benefited from enhancements after the initial trial, which would have allowed for a more complete
line of questioning.
202 Id. at 1427 ("The failure of a defendant to discover potentially useful evidence at the time of the
former proceeding does not constitute a lack of opportunity to cross-examine . . .. often information will
surface after a trial that, if known to a defense attorney, would have made the cross-examination of a
witness more thorough or even more advantageous to the defendant. Nevertheless, that lack of
information does not make the opportunity for cross-examination ineffective even though the crossexamination itself is less than optimal for the defendant." (internal citations omitted)).
203 Id. (citing United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he emphasis in
[the Rule 804(b)(1)] inquiry is upon the motive underlying the cross-examination rather than the actual
exchange that took place."); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (under Rule 804(b)(1), the defendant is entitled to "'an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."')).
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arraignment, or immediately thereafter. 204 Giving the defendant such a prompt
opportunity to cross-examine would deprive the defendant of the time needed to
arrange, plan, or conspire to intimidate, harass, threaten, bribe, or kill the chief
witness against him. It would also provide the defendant with the right to the most
effective kind of cross-examination-namely contemporaneous cross-examination
before the witness has had a chance to revise, reflect, or alter testimony in
accordance with possible prosecutorial preparing or coaching. The argument that
contemporaneous and immediate cross-examination may be less effective than
cross-examination after the cross-examining attorney has had considerable time for
investigation and learning additional facts that may be helpful in a later crossexamination has already been rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Koon20 5 and the
Supreme Court in Green,206 and in any case is more than adequately counterbalanced by the advantages to the defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine
before the witness can be coached or prepped by the prosecution.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Koon, 34 F.3d at 1427. See Thomas v. Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1386 n.34 (9th Cir. 1980).
206 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) ("Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing
had already been given under circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical trial.
Porter was under oath; respondent was represented by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later
represented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to his
statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial
record of the hearings.").
204
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